

Audit

Report



YEAR 2000 ISSUES WITHIN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND'S
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

OPERATIONAL EVALUATION PLANNING
BY U.S. FORCES KOREA

Report No. 99-254

September 16, 1999

Office of the Inspector General
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Acronyms

CFC	Combined Forces Command
MTW	Major Theater War
OPEVAL	Operational Evaluation
ROK	Republic of Korea
USFK	U.S. Forces Korea
Y2K	Year 2000



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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September 16, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's
Area of Responsibility-Operational Evaluation Planning by U.S. Forces
Korea (Report No. 99-254)

We are providing this report for information and use. This report is the sixth in a series resulting from our audit of "Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility." This report discusses year 2000 operational evaluation planning efforts by U.S. Forces Korea. We considered management comments on a draft of this report in preparing the final report.

Management comments on the draft report conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. Therefore, no additional comments are required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. Questions on the audit should be directed to Mr. Robert M. Murrell at (703) 604-9210 (DSN 664-9210) (rmurrell@dodig.osd.mil) or Mr. Patrick J. Nix at (703) 604-9290 (DSN 664-9290) (pnix@dodig.osd.mil). See Appendix E for the report distribution. The audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert J. Lieberman", is positioned above the printed name.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Report No. 99-254

(Project No. 8CC-0049.04)

September 16, 1999

Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility

Operational Evaluation Planning by U.S. Forces Korea

Executive Summary

Introduction. This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge.

Objectives. The overall audit objective was to evaluate whether DoD adequately planned for and managed year 2000 risks to avoid disruptions to the U.S. Pacific Command's mission. Specifically, we evaluated U.S. Forces Korea's operational evaluation planning efforts.

Results. The U.S. Forces Korea approach to evaluate the Combined Forces Command's ability to execute major theater war warfighting operations in its area of responsibility in a year 2000 environment was fundamentally sound and should result in reasonable assurance that the integrated systems identified in the "thin lines" for critical tasks will operate dependably. However, the U.S. Forces Korea overall approach did not include an evaluation of nonintegrated Republic of Korea systems that are essential to tasks critical to the Combined Forces Command warfighting capability. Without integrating an evaluation of those systems into its overall assessment approach, U.S. Forces Korea may not have the information needed to minimize risk to the Combined Forces Command warfighting mission capability.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command identify nonintegrated Republic of Korea systems and capabilities essential to the accomplishment of the Combined Forces Command's critical tasks and evaluate the year 2000 readiness of those systems. Further, we recommend integrating the results of those assessments with results from the U.S. Forces Korea's operational evaluations, to provide the Combined Forces Command with a comprehensive assessment of its mission capability in a year 2000 environment.

Management Comments. We received management comments from U.S. Forces Korea. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea also serves as Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command. U.S. Forces Korea concurred with the finding and recommendations, stating that it had identified and addressed essential nonintegrated Republic of Korea systems and capabilities. U.S. Forces Korea stated that it had established communication channels with the Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense to address Republic of Korea year 2000 efforts; continually review

Republic of Korea year 2000 efforts; and integrate the assessments of Republic of Korea year 2000 efforts in the U.S. Forces Korea operational evaluation results. A summary of management comments is in the Finding section of the report and the complete text is in the Management Comments section.

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Background

This report is one in a series resulting from our audit of "Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility." This report discusses the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) operational evaluation planning efforts for the year 2000. Other reports in the series that have been issued as final reports are identified in Appendix B.

DoD Y2K Management Strategy. In his role as the DoD Chief Information Officer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is coordinating the overall DoD year 2000 (Y2K) conversion effort. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued various iterations of a Y2K management plan to provide direction and make the DoD Components responsible for implementing the five-phase Y2K management process. The "DoD Year 2000 Management Plan," December 1998, is the most current iteration. The target completion date for implementation of mission-critical systems was December 31, 1998, and March 31, 1999, for nonmission-critical systems.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command the combatant forces. The Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the unified commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; unified operation of the combatant commands; and integration into an efficient team of air, land, and sea forces.

U.S. Pacific Command. The U.S. Pacific Command is the largest of the nine DoD unified commands. It was established as a unified command on January 1, 1947, as an outgrowth of the command structure used during World War II. The area of responsibility for the U.S. Pacific Command includes 50 percent of the earth's surface and two-thirds of the world's population. It encompasses more than 100 million square miles, stretching from the west coast of North America and South America to the east coast of Africa and from the Arctic in the north to the Antarctic in the south. It also includes Alaska, Hawaii, and eight U.S. territories. The overall mission of the U.S. Pacific Command is to promote peace, deter aggression, respond to crises, and, if necessary, fight and win to advance security and stability throughout the Asian-Pacific region.

The U.S. Pacific Command, located at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, is supported by Component commands from each Service: U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, and Marine Forces Pacific. In addition, the U.S. Pacific Command exercises combatant command over four

sub-unified commands within the region. The sub-unified commands are U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), Alaskan Command, and Special Operations Command Pacific.

U.S. Forces Korea. USFK was established in July 1957 as an outgrowth of the longtime U.S. security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The commitment began at the end of World War II when U.S. troops entered Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in the zone south of the 38th parallel.

The U.S. security commitment has legal obligations based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 1950, which tasked the United States to provide the commander of the United Nations Command, and the ROK/U.S. Mutual Security Agreement of 1954, which commits both countries to assist each other in the event of outside attack. The USFK was established as the planning headquarters to coordinate joint service activities of U.S. Forces in the ROK. The United States is also a partner in the operations of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), which was activated by the two governments in November 1978.

The CFC is a totally integrated headquarters responsible for planning the defense of the ROK and, in case of hostilities, directing the ROK/U.S. combat forces (about 650,000 ROK Armed Forces and 37,000 U.S. Service personnel) to defeat enemy aggression. With the activation of CFC, USFK became the headquarters through which U.S. combat forces would be mobilized to augment the CFC fighting components. USFK includes all U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine elements stationed in Korea. The Commander in Chief, USFK also serves as commander of the United Nations Command and the CFC.

Republic of Korea. On August 15, 1948, the ROK was established in the southern portion of the Korean peninsula following United Nations-observed elections. Korean authorities in the northern portion of the Korean peninsula refused to allow the United Nations to carry out elections north of the 38th parallel. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the north. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean Army invaded the ROK. Hostilities continued until July 27, 1953, when the military commanders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Army, the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the 16 members of the United Nations Command signed an armistice agreement. Neither the United States nor the ROK is a signatory of the armistice, though both adhere to it through the United Nations Command. No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 armistice agreement; thus, a condition of belligerency technically still exists on the divided peninsula. The USFK mission, in part, is to stabilize the international political situation on the Korean peninsula.

Objectives

The overall audit objective was to evaluate whether DoD adequately planned for and managed Y2K risks to avoid disruptions to the U.S. Pacific Command's capability to execute its mission. In this phase of the audit, we evaluated the operational evaluation (OPEVAL) planning efforts by USFK. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and Appendix B for a summary of prior coverage.

U.S. Forces Korea's Year 2000 Operational Evaluation Planning Efforts

The Joint Staff tasked USFK to evaluate its ability to engage in major theater war (MTW) warfighting operations in a Y2K environment. USFK appropriately determined that if the evaluation was to adequately test the USFK ability to conduct warfighting operations in a Y2K environment, its approach needed to be developed from the CFC perspective. The USFK approach for evaluating CFC MTW warfighting operations was fundamentally sound and should result in reasonable assurance that the integrated systems identified in the "thin lines" for critical tasks will operate dependably. However, the approach will evaluate only part of the CFC warfighting capability. The USFK overall approach did not include an evaluation of nonintegrated ROK systems that are essential to tasks critical to the CFC warfighting capability. Nonintegrated systems were not included because USFK had not identified or considered including nonintegrated (not interfaced to another mission-critical system) ROK mission-essential systems in its overall assessment approach. Without integrating those systems into its overall assessment approach, the USFK may not have the information needed to minimize risk to the CFC warfighting mission capability.

Y2K Operational Evaluations

Public Law 105-261, "Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999," October 17, 1998, directed the Secretary of Defense to ensure that at least 25 military exercises are conducted in the first 9 months of 1999 and include a simulated Y2K phase; at least 2 of the 25 exercises be conducted by the commander of each unified or specified combatant command; and all mission-critical (see Appendix C) systems, expected to be used if the Armed Forces were involved in an MTW conflict, be tested in at least 2 exercises. The objective of the requirements is to operationally evaluate the extent to which information technology and national security systems will successfully operate during the year 2000. The law allows information technology or national security systems to be excluded from the Y2K simulation phase of exercises if those systems are incapable of performing reliably in a Y2K environment. However, in those cases, the excluded systems shall be replaced in accordance with the measures outlined in their Y2K contingency plans.

The Joint Staff developed a multifaceted assessment program that leverages testing conducted at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, unified commands, Services, and agency levels to implement the requirements of Public Law 105-261. The Joint Staff program assigns the unified commands the responsibility to conduct a Y2K mission centric evaluation. The mission centric evaluation would include various "thin line systems" critical to the performance of operational missions. It would be combined with operational assessments of the contingency plans in place to support the missions in the event of system

failure. The combination of those two evaluations is designed to provide a readiness check on the unified command's ability to support joint and combined operations in a Y2K environment.

In a message dated February 27, 1999, the Joint Staff directed the commanders in chief to identify the thin-line systems architecture (from unified command to shooter) and national systems interfaces required for each critical task. In addition, the Joint Staff stated that, collectively, the systems on the commander in chief thin line systems architecture defined the set of systems required for an MTW; thus, the systems were required to be tested twice in an operational environment (once during a commanders in chief OPEVAL). Furthermore, the Joint Staff made the commanders in chief responsible for reporting the results of the headquarters to shooter evaluation, to include any segments evaluated as a part of a Service integration or functional end-to-end test.

Operational Evaluation Planning

The Joint Staff tasked USFK to evaluate its ability to engage in MTW warfighting operations in a Y2K environment. The objective of the OPEVALs was to verify that USFK could successfully execute its missions, tasks, and subtasks critical to MTW warfighting operations in a Y2K environment. To comply with Public Law 105-261 and the Joint Staff's guidance, USFK planned to conduct two evaluations of its ability to perform the tasks critical to MTW warfighting operations in a Y2K environment. The first USFK OPEVAL occurred in April 1999 and the second one was scheduled to occur in September 1999.

Task Force. To accelerate and focus its Y2K efforts on operational readiness, USFK established a task force to work full time on Y2K issues. The task force was led by the USFK Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Directorate and comprised an OPEVAL branch, a contingency assessment branch, and a technical management branch. As of March 1999, the task force was staffed with 11 USFK personnel; 7 technicians from the Joint Interoperability Test Command and the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; and part-time subject matter experts from across the USFK, its subordinate organizations, and the ROK functional staffs.

The OPEVAL branch was responsible for the planning and execution of the USFK OPEVALs so that the USFK mission-critical thin-line systems will function in a Y2K environment. In addition to testing end-item components of each thin-line system in an operational setting, the task force was responsible for conducting a Y2K assessment of each communications medium through which data generated by a thin-line system is transmitted.

Planning Conferences. The USFK task force held three conferences, between January and March 1999, to facilitate the planning of its first OPEVAL. During those conferences and through other formal and informal communications, the OPEVAL branch coordinated extensively with USFK components. As a result, USFK developed its evaluation approach; identified the tasks critical to the execution of MTW warfighting operations and the thin

lines of integrated systems and interfaces required to accomplish those tasks; developed confirmed contingency plans; and addressed other issues that affected the performance of the OPEVAL.

Evaluation Approach

USFK appropriately determined that, if the evaluation was to adequately test the USFK ability to conduct warfighting operations in a Y2K environment, its approach needed to be developed from the CFC perspective.

CFC Perspective. USFK stressed the CFC perspective and the combined nature of MTW warfighting operations in the USFK area of responsibility. Furthermore, USFK concluded that the most appropriate scope for its OPEVALs was to evaluate its ability to execute the employment phase of a CFC MTW operation. USFK determined that the tasks associated with the strategic operational, or tactical use of forces within its operational area encompassed the full spectrum of tasks (as identified in the Joint Mission Essential Task Listings) that needed to be executed during the other phases of MTW warfighting operations.

Identification of Tasks. During its planning conferences, USFK, with the assistance of its components and ROK military organizations, identified the tasks and subtasks critical to the employment phase. USFK developed operational and systems architectures to identify the information flows critical to the accomplishment of those tasks. It then matched the operational and systems architectures to one another and eliminated any duplicative information flows. Those efforts resulted in USFK identifying 15 unique thin lines of interlocking strings of systems and interfaces required to accomplish or support the employment phase's mission-critical tasks and subtasks (from headquarters to shooter). USFK planned to use a number of different testing techniques to conduct its evaluation of its ability to accomplish the critical tasks supported by the 15 thin lines. USFK planned to use two OPEVALs; a number of the Services' integration tests; and other tests, exercises, demonstrations, and experiments. We concluded that the USFK approach for evaluating the MTW warfighting operations in its area of responsibility was fundamentally sound, with the exception of not including essential nonintegrated ROK mission-essential systems.

Essential Nonintegrated ROK Systems

The overall USFK evaluation planning approach did not include an evaluation of nonintegrated ROK systems that were essential to tasks critical to the CFC warfighting capability. USFK had not identified or considered including non-integrated ROK mission-essential systems in its overall assessment approach.

ROK civil and military organizations and commercially operated companies provide support vital to the successful accomplishment of tasks critical to the CFC warfighting capability. For example, during a conflict, CFC would rely

on rail to transport troops from staging areas to the battle zone and to move ammunition and ordinance. The Korean National Railroad uses computerized systems to centrally control rail traffic and to perform signaling and switching. In another example, the ROK Army would use an information system for storing, maintaining, and moving ammunition. During a conflict, the ROK Army would provide USFK with periodic hard copy updates for strategic planning. None of the civil and military automated systems related to these examples interoperate with the USFK information systems that are included in the thin lines, but could be affected by Y2K problems.

The USFK OPEVAL approach did not assess the ability of the rail and ammunition systems to function in a Y2K environment. Neither did it assess the effect the failure those systems would have on the CFC warfighting capability. Potentially, the ongoing outreach activities described in Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-163, "Host Nation Support to U.S. Forces Korea," May 17, 1999, can be used to facilitate the necessary exchange of information.

USFK needed to identify nonintegrated ROK systems that are essential to the accomplishment of CFC critical tasks and subtasks; obtain and evaluate the status and efforts to fix Y2K problems affecting those systems relating to CFC's ability to perform the tasks and subtasks supported by those systems; operationally evaluate those systems and the critical tasks or subtasks that they support in a Y2K environment; and integrate the results of those evaluations, along with results from USFK operational evaluations, to provide the CFC with a comprehensive assessment of its mission capability in a Y2K environment.

Conclusion

The approach USFK developed to evaluate the CFC ability to engage in MTW warfighting operations in a Y2K environment is fundamentally sound and should result in reasonable assurance that the integrated systems identified in the thin lines for critical tasks will operate dependably. However, the overall approach did not include an evaluation of nonintegrated ROK systems that are essential to tasks or subtasks critical to the CFC warfighting capability. Without integrating an evaluation of those systems and the tasks or subtasks the systems support into its overall operational assessment approach, USFK may not have the information needed to fully conclude whether the CFC warfighting mission can be accomplished in a Y2K environment.

Recommendations and Management Comments

1. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command:

a. Identify the nonintegrated Republic of Korea systems and capabilities that are essential to the accomplishment of Combined Forces Command's critical tasks or subtasks.

b. Request the Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense to provide information on the status and efforts to fix year 2000 problems affecting the Republic of Korea systems and capabilities identified during the implementation of Recommendation 1.a.

c. Evaluate the impact of the status and efforts to fix the year 2000 problems affecting the nonintegrated Republic of Korea systems on the Combined Forces Command's ability to perform the tasks and subtasks supported by those systems.

d. Integrate the results of those evaluations with results from the U.S. Forces Korea operational evaluations, to provide the Combined Forces Command with a comprehensive assessment of its mission capability in a year 2000 environment.

Management Comments. USFK provided comments. The Commander in Chief, USFK also serves as the Commander in Chief, CFC. USFK concurred, stating that the recommendations had already been implemented. USFK stated that it had identified and addressed essential nonintegrated ROK systems and capabilities. USFK also stated that it had established communication channels with the ROK Ministry of National Defense to address ROK Y2K efforts; continually review ROK Y2K efforts; and integrate the assessments of ROK Y2K efforts into the USFK OPEVALs results.

Appendix A. Audit Process

This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the Y2K computing challenge. For a listing of audit projects addressing the issue, see the Y2K web pages on the IGnet at <http://www.ignet.gov>.

Scope

We reviewed and evaluated the USFK OPEVAL planning efforts. We met with the Y2K focal points for the USFK; U.S. Eighth Army; 7th Air Force; U.S. Naval Forces, Korea; U.S. Marine Corps, Korea; and the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade to obtain the status of those organizations' Y2K operational evaluation planning efforts. We obtained documentation including descriptions of the tasks critical to MTW warfighting operations in Korea, the operational and systems architectures developed to identify the thin line of systems and interfaces critical to the accomplishment of those tasks, and the plan USFK developed to conduct its OPEVALs of those thin lines and the critical tasks the thin lines support. Finally, we compared the approach USFK developed to conduct its OPEVALs against those described in the Year 2000 Operational Evaluation Guide issued by the Joint Staff. We used the information to assess the soundness of the USFK approach for evaluating its ability to perform the tasks critical to MTW warfighting operations in Korea.

DoD-Wide Corporate-Level Goals. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, DoD established 6 DoD-wide corporate-level performance objectives and 14 goals for meeting the objectives. This report pertains to achievement of the following objective and goal.

Objective: Prepare now for an uncertain future.

Goal: Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key war fighting capabilities. (DoD-3)

DoD Functional Area Reform Goals. Most major DoD functional areas have also established performance improvement reform objectives and goals. This report pertains to achievement of the following functional area objectives and goals in the Information Technology Management Functional Area.

- **Objective:** Become a mission partner.

Goal: Serve mission information users as customers. (ITM-1.2)

-
- **Objective:** Provide services that satisfy customer information needs.
Goal: Modernize and integrate DoD information infrastructure.
(ITM-2.2)
 - **Objective:** Provide services that satisfy customer information needs.
Goal: Upgrade technology base. (ITM-2.3)

High-Risk Area. In its identification of risk areas, the General Accounting Office has specifically designated risk in resolution of the Y2K problem as high. This report provides coverage of that problem and of the overall Information Management and Technology high-risk area.

Methodology

Audit Type, Dates, and Standards. We performed this program audit from March through May 1999 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD. We did not use computer-processed data for this audit.

Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within DoD. Further details are available upon request.

Management Control Program. We did not review the management control program related to the overall audit objective because DoD recognized the Y2K issue as a material management control weakness area in the FY 1998 Annual Statement of Assurance.

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

The General Accounting Office and the Inspector General, DoD, have conducted multiple reviews related to Y2K issues. General Accounting Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov/>. Inspector General, DoD, reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.dodig.osd.mil/>. Final reports related to our audit of "Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility" are listed below.

Inspector General, DoD

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-245, "Operational Evaluation Planning at U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters," September 2, 1999.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-163, "Host Nation Support to U.S. Forces Korea," May 17, 1999.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-126, "Strategic Communications Organizations," April 6, 1999.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-125, "U.S. Forces Korea," April 7, 1999.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-086, "III Marine Expeditionary Force," February 22, 1999.

Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-085, "Hawaii Information Transfer System," February 22, 1999.

Appendix C. Glossary

Critical Mission. A mission selected by the commander in chief of a unified command, deemed essential to perform within his area of responsibility (for example, major theater war, peace enforcement operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations).

Critical Task. A function that supports successful accomplishment of a critical mission (for example, synchronizing forcible entry into theater of war; providing theater aerospace and missile defense; and providing theater strategic reception, staging, onward movement, and integration).

Interface. An electronic boundary across which two systems communicate. An interface might be a hardware connector used to link two devices, or it might be a convention used to allow communication between two software systems.

Mission Centric. An operational evaluation performed on the various thin line of systems critical to the performance of operational missions, combined with operational evaluations of contingency plans in place to support the mission in the event of system failure.

Mission Critical. A task, subtask, or system is considered mission critical if its loss would cause immediate stoppage of direct mission of wartime operations.

Mission Essential. A task, subtask, or system is considered mission essential if its loss would reduce operational capability and if it was not restored it eventually would cause mission failure.

Nonintegrated. Opposite of interface. No electronic boundary or interface across which two systems can communicate. Human intervention is required to transfer data from one system to another.

Operational Architecture. A high-level graphical depiction of operational elements (organizations) supporting the operational concept (or geographical configuration) and connectivity.

Systems Architecture. A high-level graphical depiction of the interconnection of systems, system components, and the associated interfaces within and between operational elements. This graphic may be broken down by task or subtask.

Thin Line of Systems. The minimum number of automated information platforms or systems required to perform each critical task and each critical mission.

Appendix D. Impact of the Simultaneous Execution of Contingency Plans

Despite the best efforts of DoD managers to meet the technical challenges associated with bringing all systems into Y2K compliance, there may be some systems that fail, and this may cause other systems to fail. Because of the infrastructure disruptions created by those failures, other systems that are normally capable of correctly processing data may become unable to perform. As a result, the users of affected systems may simultaneously execute the alternative procedures or workarounds outlined in their contingency or continuity of operations plans. Based on our observations, the execution of those procedures will include a number of users employing the same workarounds, which will cause the users of those systems to compete for the same resources to implement the workarounds. The risk that simultaneous execution of workarounds may cause the failure of multiple systems or missions, should there be insufficient resources to satisfy all users' workaround requirements, needs to be evaluated. USFK, in conjunction with its components, should review contingency and continuity of operations plans and initiate actions, if necessary, to ensure sufficient resources are in place to provide for the accomplishment of its most critical missions while implementing simultaneous workaround measures.

Appendix E. Report Distribution

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 Commander In Chief, U.S. Forces Korea
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U.S. Forces Korea Comments



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REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

FKCS-IR

14 AUG 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
ATTN: READINESS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT
DIRECTORATE, 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE,
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-2884

SUBJECT: Response to Draft DoDIG Audit Report on Year 2000 Issues Within the
U S Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility – Operational Evaluation Planning by
U S Forces Korea (Project No 8CC-0043 04)

1 The United States Forces, Korea comments to the Department of Defense Inspector General draft audit report on Year 2000 Issues Within the U S Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility – Operational Evaluation Planning by U S Forces Korea (Project No 8CC-0049 04) are enclosed

2 The audit report validates our conclusion that the approach we took to evaluate integrated, automated systems required for warfighting operations in a Y2K environment was sound and provided assurances that the integrated systems will operate dependably. Our approach to essential, non-integrated Republic of Korea (ROK) systems is to review and evaluate progress the ROK is making toward Y2K compliance separately from the Y2K Operations Evaluation Plan. USFK has established with the ROK Ministry of National Defense a framework to focus our collective efforts to solve the Y2K problem. We will continue to monitor the ROK efforts to meet Y2K compliance goals. We are satisfied that the ROK will be ready for operations in a Y2K environment, and the impact on our ability to accomplish our mission will be minimal.

3 Points of contact are COL Hayes, FKJ3-Y2K, DSN 723-5729, Col Graper, FKJ3-ED, DSN 736-6536, and Mr. Kanik, FKCS-IR, DSN 723-5187.

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UNITED STATES FORCES, KOREA
RESPONSE TO DRAFT DODIG AUDIT REPORT
"YEAR 2000 ISSUES WITHIN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND'S AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY – OPERATIONAL EVALUATION PLANNING BY U.S. FORCES
KOREA"
(PROJECT NO. 8CC-0049.04)

General Comments: As CFC/USFK built its Operations Evaluation (OPEVAL) thin lines, US JCS Y2K Task Force guidance was followed, i.e., the minimum number of integrated, automated systems required to accomplish a given mission or task. Therefore, by definition we did not include non-integrated systems in OPEVALs. Although there are certainly non-integrated ROK systems that are important to the CINC's mission of employment, the fact that they are not integrated means there is no value added by including them in the OPEVAL. We do, however, gain full measure of Y2K confidence by monitoring them for compliance individually.

DoDIG Recommendations for Corrective Action

Recommendation 1.a: Recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command identify the non-integrated ROK systems and capabilities that are essential to the accomplishment of CFC's critical tasks or subtasks.

USFK Response: Concur. CFC/USFK has identified the non-integrated ROK systems that are key to the command's ability to carry out its critical missions. These systems/capabilities have been addressed through Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) channels as well as through the USFK Y2K Task Force. The WHNS support is grouped into twelve functional areas.

1. Ammunition (Stored, maintained, and moved by the ROK)
2. Communications (both domestic and international circuits)
3. Engineering (Facilities and real estate, construction services and equipment)
4. Maintenance (Major end item repair, contracted maintenance)
5. Medical (Gases (Oxygen and Nitrous Oxide), some fluids, and medical recovery facilities)
6. Personnel & Labor (Direct Hire, Korean Service Corps (KSC), contracted personnel, and Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA))
7. POL (Fuel movement and Trans-Korean Pipeline)
8. Security (Korean National Police, Security Guard Program, and support for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI))
9. Services (Laundry and bath, waste removal)
10. Supplies (Water, materials, foodstuff)
11. Transportation (Mobilized commercial vehicles, aircraft, and ships)
12. NBC.

The USFK Task Force monitors ROK support/preparedness in 13 major categories, some of which are also covered under WHNS. Those categories are:

1. Bank and Finance
2. Telecommunications
3. Electricity and Energy
4. Nuclear Power Plants
5. Transportation
6. Shipping Ports
7. Small and Medium Businesses
8. Health and Medical Services
9. Defense
10. Automated Industrial Facilities
11. Central and Local Governments
12. Environmental Concerns
13. Water Resources

Recommendation 1.b: Recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command request the ROK MND to provide information on the status and efforts to fix Y2K problems affecting the ROK systems and capabilities identified during the implementation of Recommendation 1.a.

USFK Response: Concur. USFK has established dialogue with the ROK through two channels into the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to discuss and share Y2K information and readiness status. The first channel is through the Y2K Task Force. There is contact at the General Officer Level between MG William Lennox, Jr., the USFK J3 and Y2K Coordinator, and RADM Ahn, Sung Mo, the Director General of the Information Planning Bureau, MND. Additionally, regular meetings are held between the USFK Y2K Task Force and the Systems Integration Bureau, MND. The second channel is through the WHNS program. Regular meetings are held between the MND and USFK to discuss WHNS issues. In March 1999, BG Wade McManus, Jr., USFK ACofS, J4, formally requested that the Logistics Procurement Bureau, MND, address the Y2K status of all the ROK systems that support USFK and that they provide assurance that those systems will function properly.

Recommendation 1.c: Recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command evaluate the impact of the status and efforts to fix the Y2K problems affecting the non-integrated ROK systems on the CFC's ability to perform the tasks and subtasks supported by those systems.

USFK Response: Concur. CFC/USFK is continually reviewing the progress the ROK is making towards Y2K compliance and is satisfied that the ROK will be ready for Y2K and that the impact on the command's ability to accomplish its mission will be minimal. The DoDIG Y2K Audit Team that visited USFK from 6-23 July 1999 also expressed approval of our HNS efforts, as they had no findings in the Host Nation Support area, and at the Exit Conference briefed that our HNS efforts were on track. USFK will continue to monitor the ROK efforts in the remaining months to ensure it meets the Y2K compliance goals.

Recommendation 1.d: Recommend that the Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command integrate the results of those evaluations with results from the USFK OPEVALS, to provide the CFC with a comprehensive assessment of its mission capability in a Y2K environment.

USFK Response: Concur. CFC/USFK will evaluate the results of the April and September 1999 OPEVALS and the status of ROK systems to ensure ROK-US CFC/USFK is prepared to continue operations into the new millennium. The command does not anticipate any problems with Y2K events as contingency plans and continuity of operations plans have been developed to counter any problems that may arise.

Audit Team Members

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